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Abstract 
We present an exploration of a reputation system 
based on explicit ratings weighted by the values of 
corresponding financial transactions from the 
perspective of its ability to grant “security” to 
market participants by protecting them from scam 
and “equity” in terms of having real qualities of the 
participants correctly assessed. We present a 
simulation modeling approach based on the selected 
reputation system and discuss the results of the 
simulation.  
1 Introduction 
The latest developments in e-Commerce and the emergence 
of global commercial online ecosystems with world-wide 
connectivity based on the Internet makes it critical to assess 
the reliability of the vendors and suppliers in these 
ecosystems in reliable way [Zheng and Jin, 2009]. Multiple 
design solutions for reputation systems serving the purpose 
exist, such as discussed by other authors: [Swamynathan et 
al., 2010], [Sänger and Pernul, 2018]. The most critical part 
of any system intended for this purpose appears to be the 
ability to handle a high degree of anonymity [Androulaki et 
al., 2008] of market participants, as it is characteristic of 
modern distributed [Gupta et al., 2003] ecosystems, 
including ones that are based on public networks [Blömer et 
al., 2015] such as blockchains.   
 
In particular, in this work, we rely on a reputation system 
design based on the “weighted liquid rank” concept [Kolonin 
et al., 2018] and an implementation of the concept [Kolonin 
et al., 2019] applied to generic multi-agent marketplaces. 
Given the existing implementation of the system itself and 
the simplistic simulation described in the latter publication, 
in scope of this work we provide a more advanced simulation 
modeling of the same system and investigate market 
conditions which make it possible for honest market 
participants to be granted “security”, protecting them from 
scam, and “equity”, ensuring that their qualities are assessed 
fairly in the market.  
  
2 Reputation System Implementation 
Most of the “weighted liquid rank” design of the reputation 
system per [Kolonin et al., 2018] and its implementation 
according to [Kolonin et al., 2019] are used in this work, and 
we here we expand upon these earlier findings, that the 
reputation system based on explicit ratings weighted by 
financial values provides the best combination of “security” 
and “equity”. In this work we focus primarily on use of only 
explicit ratings weighted by financial values. It should be 
noted that, as in the latter work, it has been found that a ratio 
of 10% suppliers and 90% consumers with no overlap is 
typical in generic online marketplaces, and because of this 
the reputation of consumers as raters cannot be assessed 
accordingly, thus the “liquid” part of the algorithm is not 
effectively applicable in such a case and only the “weighted” 
is employed. 
 
Algorithm 1 Weighted Liquid Rank (simplified version) 
Inputs:  
1) Volume of rated transactions each with financial 
value of the purchased product or service and rating 
value evaluating quality of the product/service, 
covering specified period of time; 
2) Reputation ranks for every participant at the end of 
the previous time period.  
Parameters: List of parmeters, affecting computations 
- default value, logarithmic ratings, conservatism, 
decayed value, etc. 
Outputs: Reputation ranks for every participant at the 
end of the previous time period.  
1: foreach of transactions do 
2:  let rater_value be rank of the rater at the end of 
  previous period of default value 
3:  let rating_value be rating supplied by  
  trasaction rater (consumer) to ratee (supplier) 
4:  let rating_weight be financial value of the  
  transaction of its logarithm, if logarithmic ratings 
  parameter is set to true 
5:  sum rater_value*rating_value*rating_weight for 
  every ratee  
6: end foreach 
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7:  do normalization of the sum of the muliplications 
 per ratee to range 0.0-1.0, get differential_ranks 
8: do blending of the old_ranks known at the end of 
 previous peiod with differential_ranks based on 
 parameter of conservatism, so that new_ranks = 
 (old_ranks*conservatism+N*(1-differential_ranks)), 
 using decayed value if no rating are given to ratee 
 during the period  
9: do normalization of new_ranks to range 0.0-1.0 
10: return new_ranks 
 
We have explored two alternative open-source 
implementations of the reputation system based on the 
referenced design. The first one was based on the 
Reputationer class in Aigents Java project at 
https://github.com/aigents/aigents-java/ with a Python 
adapter for the SingularityNET reputation system prototype 
as in the aigents_reputation_api.py script of the 
https://github.com/singnet/reputation/ project. The second 
version was based on a native Python implementation as the 
reputation_service_api.py script in the latter project.  
 
During the simulation modeling, the impact of the following 
parameters of the reputation system were explored: 
⚫ Rd - default initial reputation rank; 
⚫ Rc - decayed reputation in range to be approached 
by inactive agents eventually; 
⚫ C - conservatism as a blending “alpha” factor 
between the previous reputation rank recorded at 
the beginning of the observed period and the 
differential one obtained during the observation 
period; 
⚫ FullNorm – when this boolean option is set to True 
the reputation system performs a full-scale 
normalization of incremental ratings; 
⚫ LogRatings - when this boolean option is set to 
True the reputation system applies log10(1+value) 
to financial values used for weighting explicit 
ratings; 
⚫ Aggregation - when this boolean option is set to 
True the reputation system aggregates all explicit 
ratings between each unique combination of two 
agents with computes a weighted average of 
ratings across the observation period; 
⚫ Downrating - when this boolean option is set to 
True the reputation system translates original 
explicit rating values in range 0.0-0.25 to negative 
values in range -1.0 to 0.0 and original values in 
range 0.25-1.0 to the interval 0.0-1.0.  
⚫ UpdatePeriod – the number of days to update 
reputation state, considered as observation period 
for computing incremental reputations. 
3 Reputation System Simulation 
Based on a market analysis reported on in the referenced 
work [Kolonin et al., 2019] where it was affirmed that a ratio 
of 9:1 between buyers and sellers (9 times as many buyers 
than sellers) was the most realistic, we used this ratio as a 
fixed market parameter. With this ratio, we simulated 
populations of 1000 agents interacting over 6 months on an 
everyday basis.  We also implemented feedback, making the 
reputation system available to consumers for choosing 
suppliers, who then rate them in the same reputation system.  
 
During initial simulations, 80% of the population were 
“good” agents with fair market behaviors and the remaining 
20% were “bad” agents that commit scams. It was also 
assumed that the amount of “bad” agent transactions is higher 
than the amount of “good” agent transactions as a result of 
the “bad” agents pumping up the reputation of “fake” 
suppliers as they pose as consumers. It was assumed that an 
average “bad” agent spends substantially less on every 
transaction, compared to an average “good” agent. 
Specifically, in the simulations it was assumed that “bad” 
agents emit 10 times more transactions a day than the good 
ones, but the ratio of the average transaction payment amount 
was varied. For the latter ratio, we considered three types of 
conditions: an “unhealthy” market with a ratio equal to 10 (so 
the “good” agents have just 10 times more costly purchases), 
a “semi-healthy” one with a ratio of 20 and a “healthy” one 
with a ratio of 100. 
 
The simulation, the code of which is at 
https://github.com/singnet/reputation/tree/master/agency/pyt
hon/src/snsim/reputation, is meant to resemble a market 
place, in which there are different product or service 
categories that have a variety of prices reflective of the 
market. Each supplier agent has an intrinsic ability to satisfy 
its customers with its product or service, and ratings of each 
supplier are normally distributed around this “expected 
goodness” (Rcea as defined further), here drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean of 0.75 and standard deviation of 0.15 
to N(0.75, 0.0225), bucketed into five ratings of 0.0, 0.25, 0.5 
0.75 and 1.0.  Scammer agents are consistently given a zero 
by good agents.  Each agent has different (normally 
distributed) needs for every product or service, and shops for 
what it needs the most first.  There is a normally distributed 
time until each product or service is needed again. There is a 
limit to how much shopping an agent can do in a day, and the 
number of active agents can vary. Agents have differing 
(normally distributed) propensities to try out new agents, 
different tolerances for staying with the old ones, and 
different capacities to forget.  Bad agents have a normally 
distributed ring size of other bad agents which they 
(mutually) rate positively, here drawn from N(8,4)  
  
Algorithm 2 Market Simulation 
Input: Consumer and Supplier trade behaviors 
 
Output: Metrics, Agent qualities, transactions, ranks 
 
1: Assign Agents to Behaviors based on Normal 
Random Variates 
2: Every day for 6 months: 
 Each consumer makes shopping list 
 Agents drop past suppliers according to satisfaction 
 Agents make purchases and rate suppliers  
3: Print metrics  
4 Performance Metrics 
In this work we extend the range of the metrics used in 
referenced research [Kolonin et al., 2019]. The first key 
metric measures are the economic parameters of the market 
such as volume ratio for market spending by “good” agents 
versus “bad” agents (Vg / Vb ), the percentage of funds spent 
by “good” agents to “bad” scammers  or “loss to scam” 
(Cgbg ), and the ratio between the earnings of scammers and 
their spendings or “profit from scam” (Cgbb). The latter 
financial metrics serve to identify the amount of financial 
resources that fair consumers lose in scams, or the relative 
amount that scammers would earn by cheating the reputation 
system, so changes in these values based on use of the 
reputation system can actually provide the business value of 
using it.   
Further we measure utility, or how happy fair consumers are 
with their purchases. It is the average rating given to 
purchases, regardless of the kind of purchase.  This metric 
would shift with different rules for ratings, such as a different 
default rating, however, within a scenario this metric has the 
same relative value. 
    (1) 
 
 
where Fij is the sum of all ratings made by good agents and N 
is the number of ratings made by all of the good agents, i.e. 
all agents which have an expected goodness of Rea = 1, to be 
discussed further on. 
 
We also explored metrics that assess the reputation system’s 
prediction of the quality of each agent to be either good or 
bad, or ability of the reputation system to have a high 
accuracy for both assessments, following the referenced work 
[Kolonin et al., 2019]. These metrics compare distributions 
of expected reputations Rea per agent a against lists of 
computed reputations Rca for the same set of agents. In our 
work these values are measured on continuous scale, so Rea 
is used to assess the reputation system’s ability to predict the 
level of “goodness” of an agent. The “bad” agents are 
expected to have Rea close to 0.0, while the “good” agents are 
expected to have Rea substantially greater than 0 and up to 1.0.  
 
The standared Pearson correlation coefficient PCC between 
Rca and Rea is used in the referenced work [Kolonin et al., 
2019].  However, it makes it possible to evaluate only overall 
quality of prediction so if the PCC value is below 1.0 then 
one can’t tell if it is because the flawed “security” or missed 
“equity”. Because of the reason, we have also used a 
“weighted Pearson correlation coefficient,” weighted so that 
agents matter in proportion to how good they are, or how bad 
they are, in order to indicate the capacity of the reputation 
system to be used for security (by being good at determining 
which agents may be scammers) vs. the capacity of the 
reputation system to judge the quality of the honest agent’s 
products fairly, so that they may participate proportionately 
in the economy. 
where avg(y,w) is a weighted average.  For PCCG, the PCC 
weighted towards good, w is the (Rcea) vector.  For PCCB it 
is the (1-Rcea) vector.  We report the weighted average of the 
market volume of the PCC, PCCG and PCCB per product or 
service category, called PCC by category, PCCG by 
category, and PCCB by category.  This is useful because we 
are ultimately looking for a way to compare providers of a 
product or service category, and PCC is a good way to 
measure the ability to rank. 
 
The standard confusion matrix metrics for recall, precision, 
F1 and accuracy have been used to assess the “security” as 
effectiveness of the reputation system for the primary 
reputation system goal of protecting the public from scams. 
That is, reputation system was considered a tool to solve 
“classification problem” categorizing agents as either “good” 
or “bad”, in the sense of agent being a fair one or a scammer, 
respectively. Here, a positive result would mean either a 
“good” agent is categorized as “good” in the sense that it is 
not a scammer when it is scored over a threshold or a “bad” 
agent categorized as “bad”, respectively. It is a counted as a 
true positive if the agent is in fact good, and is a false positive 
if the agent is in fact bad. On the other hand, if an agent is 
scored under the threshold and is in fact good it is a false 
negative, and if the agent scores under the threshold and is in 
fact bad, it is a true negative. In our work, we have used the 
threshold as 40% reputation rank value on scale between 0% 
and 100%, based on search for the optimal threshold value 
differentiating the “good” and the “bad” to the greater extent.  
5 Simulation Results 
We present three scenario experiments on the reputation 
system to find the sets of parameters in which the reputation 
system performs best as well as the boundary values of those 
        If reputation system in use: 
            If "winner take all" usage: 
                Agents choose new suppliers with the highest 
                   reputation score 
            Else if "roulette wheel" usage: 
                Agents choose new suppliers in proportion to 
                    their reputation scores 
            Else if "thresholded random" usage: 
                Agents choose new suppliers randomly over a 
                     reputation score threshold 
                Agents make purchases and rate suppliers 
        Else if reputation system not in use: 
            If agents have no experience with suppliers  
                Agents choose new suppliers randomly 
       
 
parameters. The first is an experiment is a test of the 
parameters under the conditions of a market that is close to 
equilibrium, that is, a market in which there is neither a 
serious oversupply or serious shortages.  Next, in order to test 
the robustness of the reputation system we look at its usage 
and presentation, in the usual case, where agents trade with 
suppliers in proportion to their ratings, and additionally 
extremes where agents choose the top-rated supplier, as well 
as where they simply choose a random supplier over a 
threshold. Finally, to see if the reputation is robust with 
respect to market volume surges we take the champion 
parameters of the equilibrium market and use them to test 
another setting of the reputation system: the periodic setting, 
where the update period is set longer than a day, in contexts 
with and without periodic surges in purchasing.   
 
The simulation was focused on the case where the reputation 
system with explicit ratings weighted by financial 
transactions is used. For this case we have explored different 
combinations of parameters evaluating different metrics to 
access the level of “security” and “equity” provided by the 
reputation system.     
 
The extent to which system can provide “security” and 
“equity” is illustrated by Fig.1 below. We clearly see that we 
can identify "bad agents" with loss of 2 "false negatives".  At 
first glance one would think that this system only separates 
the scammers from the honest agents, providing “security” 
while not giving fair ratings to the quality of the honest 
agents:  it seems that it cannot identify the expected goodness 
so the “equity” is not granted.  However, the next figure 
shows that when you take each product or service category 
into account separately, it does predict an agents ratings 
accurately. 
Figure 1. This is an illustration of the suppliers from a sample run 
of 1000 agents, 10% of which are suppliers. Each bar is a single 
supplier.  The reputation system parameters are FullNorm=True, 
Weighting=True, LogRatings=False, Rd=0.5, C=0.5, Rc=0.0, 
Downrating=False.  On the upper left we present computed 
goodness (Rca) and on the upper right we present expected 
goodness(Rea), both ordered by computed goodness.  On the lower 
left we present expected goodness (Rea) and the lower right we 
present computed goodness (Rca), both ordered by expected 
goodness.  In the charts on the upper and lower right, scammers 
appear on the left, and honest agents on the right. 
 
Indeed, the Fig.2 presents how the expected goodness can be 
evaluated on per-category basis, assuming that evaluation of 
reputation is domain-specific [Kolonin et al., 2018], 
according to specific price ranges and sub-markets of specific 
kind of goods or services of the greater market. Where there 
are more suppliers and thus more market volume, regardless 
of whether bad agents are present, the calculated goodness 
are more predictive of the expected goodness of the agent. 
The predictions are accurate wherever there are more than 
three samples.  This result shows a consistent clear 
demarcation between bad agents on the left of each chart and 
the good agents on the right. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  These charts from a single sample run show the calculated 
goodness (Rca) along the X axis and the expected goodness value 
(Rea) on the Y axis, separated by product or service category.  They 
include the product or service categories of the realistic simulation 
that have more than one supplier.  Rca is more predictive of Rea the 
larger the sample size (the slope approaching 1), and is accurate 
wherever the sample size is over three.  
  
Figure 3. The first of three market scenario types to test the 
parameterization and robustness of the reputation system.  In this 
equilibrium scenario, the boundary value tested is the market 
volume ratio, and the parameters tested are the conservatism 
(conserv) and default parameters.  MVR (Market Volume Ratio) 
states: healthy: over 200 semi-heathy: 75-200, unhealthy: below 75.  
The best performing combination, default 0.5/conservatism 0.5, is 
underlined. 
 
Figure 4.  In the second market scenario type we test the robustness 
of the reputation system against both normal and extreme usages, 
where “Roulette Wheel” indicates agent choice in proportion to the 
calculated reputation values, “Thresholded Random” indicates that 
agents choose suppliers randomly but over a threshold, and “Winner 
Take All” indicates that agents choose the top ranked suppliers.   
 
Figure 3 illustrates how, in a healthy market, the reputation 
system is effective in reducing the loss of consumers to 
scam,ensuring that nearly all of the suppliers it recommends 
are fair market participants while at the same time rating them 
fairly.  At test of multiple simulation runs shows that, in a 
healthy market scenario, there is a 99% chance that the Loss 
to Scam that comsumers suffer is less when the reputation 
system is in use than when it is not. In our consideration of 
the importance of balance between offerring protection from 
scammers and making sure no honest suppliers are rated 
fairly, we have underlined the "champion" parameter 
combination that meets both goals, default 0.5 and 
conservatism 0.5. 
 
The healthy market champion's precision of 1.0 in Figure 3 
shows that the reputation system did not recommend any of 
the scammers despite their best efforts at pumping their 
ratings, while at the same time rating the non-scammers fairly 
as evidenced by the Pearson-good by category score of 0.92. 
The Pearson by category scores show that the system ranks 
all agents effectively within a category of goods and services.  
If default is set low, then we can make the consumers slightly 
happier with their purchases as a result of the reduced loss to 
scam, but this is at the expense of ranking good agents fairly.   
 
Figure 4 illustrates the effectiveness of the reputation system 
under different usages.  One possible usage is winner take all, 
when reputation system scores are presented to consumers 
such that they would probably just take the highest scoring 
supplier.  Such a usage has increased the happiness that 
consumers have in thier products (increased utility by 11%), 
however more studies need to be done in other scenarios that 
have enterers and leavers, as winner take all dyanamics have 
been known to close markets to newcomers and thus 
ultimately result in lower utility.  The healthy market with 
winner take all dynamics was poor in ranking fair suppliers 
(Pearson-good by category of 0.71).  However, our champion 
scenario, which models the case where customers are 
presented with the reputation system such that they would 
select agents in proportion to their reputation scores, ranked 
non-scamming suppliers fairly (Pearson-good by category of 
0.9) so they can participate in the economy.  Proportionate 
selection usage is roulette wheel selection [Bäck Thomas, 
1996], which does better than the thresholded random usage 
which does not rank quite as well. 
 
 
Figure 5. In the third market scenario type, the period that the 
reputation system is updated is tested, in scenarios that are periodic 
(the default) in that there is a surge of purchasing every seven days 
for half of the goods, and scenarios which are.  Scenarios with no 
reputation system are presented for comparison in all scenario types, 
and best performing parameter combinations in both healthy and 
semi-healthy markets, is underlined. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how the reputation system performs well 
even in markets that have periodic surges.  The champion of 
the market is the champion of the entire paper, where the 
reputation system which updates only every week , on a 
market with weekend purchasing surges, has a 0.98 Pearson-
good by category score.  In markets without surges, the same 
system performs nearly as well, and still reduces loss to scam 
over the reputation system without the update period and over 
no reputation system.   
 
Based on studies within the scope of performed simulations, 
the following observations were made.   
 
⚫ The best set of reputation parameters are:  
Weighting=True, LogRatings=False, Rd=0.5, C=0.5, 
Rc=0.0, Downrating=False.   
⚫ Parameters that matter to the result are Weighting, Rd, C, 
and Rc.  FullNorm does not matter to the result, and  
Downrating and LogRatings consistently detract from 
the result.  
⚫ The reputation system cuts the loss to scam (LTS) that 
consumers suffer nearly in half.  In a healthy market 
LTS is cut from 0.06% to 0.03 or 0.04%. 
⚫ The reputation system gives an excellent ability to rank 
good agents by product or service category and discern 
bad agents in a healthy market, with Pearson-good by 
category scores over 0.9 and precision of discerning bad 
agents of 1.0, and little societal loss to scam (< 0.0003).  
The capability of the reputation is retained in the semi-
healthy market, but decreases dramatically in the 
unhealthy market (Pearson of 0.61) making the semi-
healthy market the borderline condition for the 
reputation system to function.  
⚫ The reputation system can handle periodic sales (such as 
seasonal and weekly surges in purchasing) with the 
same ability to rank good agents and discern bad 
(Pearson scores >= 0.9 and precision of 1.0). If there is 
no periodicity in purchases, but the periodic mode of the 
reputation system is on, the performance is comparable 
(Pearson scores = 0.89 and precision of 1.0), however, 
if there is a periodicity in purchases and periodic mode 
is not employed, performance is slightly lower (Pearson 
scores = 0.83 and precision of 1.0). 
⚫ The reputation system performs best when used by 
agents to trade with suppliers in proportion to their 
calculated goodness scores (Precision 1.0, Pearson 
scores >=0.9) but still works adequately at the extremes 
of “Winner Take All” choice of suppliers (Precision 1.0, 
Pearson scores >= 70) and random above threshold 
choice (Precision 1.0, Pearson scores >= 80) 
⚫ It may be possible to incentivize agents to trade with 
suppliers in proportion to their calculated goodness 
scores financially, not only to keep the reputation 
system accurate, but in the interest of equity. 
⚫ Further studies need to be done on automatically finding 
a threshold under which an agent is never 
recommended.  Dynamic adjustment of the threshold 
will make the system even more robust against market 
conditions.   
6 Conclusion 
Based on the presented work, we can make the following 
conclusions. 
 
⚫ For the studied market conditions, the use of the 
reputation system based on explicit ratings weighted by 
financial values of transactions provides both “security” 
in the form of protection from scam and “equity” for the 
honest participants of the market 
⚫ The parameters that we have found may be used for fine-
tuning of the real reputation systems and the metrics that 
we define may be used to optimize these parameters in 
further studies. 
⚫ The options suggested for threshold management, and 
for the incentivization of users to choose amongst the 
listed suppliers in proportion to their reputation scores 
may be considered as an extra application layer on top of 
the reputation system.   
 
The following issues will be considered for our further work. 
 
⚫ Make the simulations more realistic, exploring larger 
scales of markets above 1000 agents and 6 months, 
studying wider ranges of possible market conditions, 
with different populations of scamming agents, different 
ratios of transactions committed by the agents and 
implementing different temporal patterns of the 
behaviors of the agents, primarily having different rates 
of newcomers and leavers. 
⚫ Evaluate possibility to improve “security” and “equity” 
with use of rating aggregation. 
⚫ Explore possibility of implementation of dynamic 
reputation threshold management enabling to cut off 
“most likely scam” from “most likely honest” and study 
its effect on “security” and “equity”. 
⚫ Explore possibility of implementation and evaluation of 
the incentivization of the honest agents to act as 
members of “reputation militia” so the consumers are 
choosing suppliers in proportion to their scores.  
⚫ Implementation and simulation of the staking-based 
reputations [Kolonin et al., 2018] and exploration of its 
impact on improvement of “equity”, especially in the 
case with newcomers entering the system and leavers 
leaving the one at realistic rates.   
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